Pujitha Jayasundara and Hemasiri Fernando after convicted.
Abstract
This article examines the legal standards governing criminal negligence liability of senior public officials under Sri Lankan law, with particular reference to the July 2026 convictions and death sentences imposed on former Inspector General of Police Pujith Jayasundara and former Defence Secretary Hemasiri Fernando for their failure to prevent the 2019 Easter Sunday bombings. It analyses the distinction between civil and criminal negligence, the relevant provisions of the Penal Code, the elevated duties of public officers charged with crime prevention, and the application of these principles in the context of intelligence failures leading to mass-casualty terrorism. The article situates the 2026 High Court Trial-at-Bar judgments within the broader framework of omission liability and assesses their implications for accountability in national security governance. It also briefly notes the contemporaneous September 2026 convictions of fifteen individuals for conspiracy and related terrorism offences arising from the same attacks.
Introduction
The coordinated suicide bombings of 21 April 2019 in Sri Lanka, which targeted three churches and three luxury hotels and claimed approximately 269–279 lives while injuring more than 500 people, remain among the deadliest terrorist incidents in the country’s post-civil-war history. Subsequent inquiries, including a Presidential Commission of Inquiry and a landmark 2023 Supreme Court fundamental-rights judgment, established that senior security and political officials had received repeated, credible intelligence warnings—originating both from Indian agencies and domestic sources—yet failed to take adequate preventive measures.
In July 2026, a three-judge Permanent High Court Trial-at-Bar, by majority decision, convicted Jayasundara and Fernando on 854 of 855 charges of criminal negligence, dereliction of official duty, and related offences, imposing death sentences. A dissenting judge would have acquitted both accused. These convictions followed the Supreme Court’s earlier order setting aside a 2022 acquittal and directing that the trial continue so that the defence could be heard. Separately, on 22 September 2026, another Trial-at-Bar convicted fifteen individuals of conspiracy, aiding and abetting, and related terrorism offences under the Prevention of Terrorism Act, imposing rigorous imprisonment terms ranging from 200 to 260 years and ordering confiscation of assets; nine co-accused were acquitted.
This article focuses primarily on the negligence liability of the two senior officials. It analyses the doctrinal standards applied, the statutory basis for liability arising from omission, and the broader implications for the criminal responsibility of public officers entrusted with the protection of life and national security.
The Legal Framework of Criminal Negligence in Sri Lanka
Sri Lankan criminal law, heavily influenced by English common-law principles, draws a sharp distinction between civil and criminal negligence. Civil liability may arise from ordinary lack of care that causes harm. Criminal liability, by contrast, demands a significantly higher degree of fault.
The governing principle, repeatedly affirmed by Sri Lankan courts, is that formulated by Lord Hewart C.J. in R v Bateman (1925) 19 Cr App R 8 and endorsed by the House of Lords in Andrews v Director of Public Prosecutions [1937] AC 576: the negligence must go “beyond a mere matter of compensation between subjects and show such disregard for the life and safety of others as to amount to a crime against the State and conduct deserving punishment.” Simple carelessness, error of judgment, or ordinary negligence sufficient for civil recovery is inadequate. A very high degree of negligence—often characterised as gross negligence or recklessness—must be proved beyond reasonable doubt.
This standard has been consistently applied by the Court of Appeal and other Sri Lankan courts in cases involving section 298 of the Penal Code (causing death by a rash or negligent act not amounting to culpable homicide) and related provisions. Authorities such as Karunadasa v Officer-in-Charge, Motor Traffic Division, Police Station, Nittambuwa and Premasiri v Officer-in-Charge, Police Station, Matara reaffirm that an error of judgment does not, without more, establish criminal liability.
Statutory Foundations: Penal Code Provisions and Public-Servant Duties
Section 298 of the Penal Code provides the core offence of causing death by rash or negligent act. More serious liability may arise under the provisions governing culpable homicide and murder where death results from an illegal omission by a person under a legal duty to act. The Penal Code illustrations explicitly contemplate public officers whose omissions (for example, a jailor failing to supply food) can ground liability for murder or attempted murder when the requisite knowledge or intention is present.
Public servants are defined broadly in section 19 of the Penal Code to include officers whose duty it is to prevent offences, protect public health, safety or convenience, or bring offenders to justice. Specific offences address intentional or negligent omissions by public servants bound to apprehend offenders or prevent crimes (sections 216–218 and related provisions). Section 112 further addresses a public servant who voluntarily conceals a design to commit an offence that it is his duty to prevent.
Complementary sources of duty include the Police Ordinance (notably section 56, imposing on every police officer a continuous duty to use his best endeavours to prevent all crimes and offences) and provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure requiring preventive action in respect of cognizable offences. Constitutional obligations under Articles 12(1) (equal protection of the law) and 14(1)(e) (freedom to manifest religion) have also been held to ground liability for executive inaction that fails to protect fundamental rights, as demonstrated in the 2023 Supreme Court fundamental-rights judgment arising from the same attacks.
Application to the Jayasundara and Fernando Convictions
The majority of the Trial-at-Bar held that both accused, as the country’s chief law-enforcement officer and the senior-most official in the Ministry of Defence respectively, were under clear legal duties to act upon intelligence warnings of imminent suicide attacks. Evidence established that warnings—including specific information received in early April 2019 and a further alert on the evening of 20 April 2019—had been communicated to them. The court found that their failure to take adequate preventive measures (such as proper dissemination of intelligence, mobilisation of resources, or convening of coordinating meetings) constituted a serious breach of duty amounting to criminal negligence and dereliction of official responsibility. The majority concluded that this omission substantially contributed to the deaths of 268 persons and the injury of 586 others.
The elevation of the charges to encompass aiding and abetting deaths through omission reflects the recognition that, where a public officer possesses both the duty and the capacity to prevent foreseeable mass harm and culpably fails to do so, the resulting liability may extend beyond ordinary section 298 negligence. The imposition of the death penalty—though subject to Sri Lanka’s long-standing de facto moratorium on executions since 1976—underscores the gravity attributed by the majority to the scale of the harm and the seniority of the officials.
The dissenting judgment, which would have acquitted both accused on the ground that the prosecution had failed to prove the charges beyond reasonable doubt, illustrates that the high threshold for criminal negligence remains a live issue of fact and degree even in cases involving extensive prior warnings.
Broader Implications and the Parallel Conspiracy Convictions
The July 2026 judgments mark a significant development in the criminal accountability of senior security officials for failures of prevention in the face of known terrorist threats. They demonstrate the willingness of Sri Lankan courts to translate findings of civil and constitutional responsibility (as in the 2023 Supreme Court compensation orders) into criminal liability where the degree of fault meets the elevated threshold.
The contemporaneous September 2026 convictions of fifteen individuals for conspiracy, aiding and abetting the suicide bombers, and related offences under the Prevention of Terrorism Act—resulting in sentences of 200 to 260 years’ rigorous imprisonment—address the distinct category of direct participation in the terrorist enterprise. Together, the two sets of proceedings illustrate a dual track of accountability: one focused on the organisers and supporters of the attacks, and the other on the officials charged with preventing them.
Conclusion
Sri Lankan law imposes criminal negligence liability on public officials only where a high degree of disregard for life and safety is established, beyond the threshold of civil negligence. In the context of national-security failures leading to mass-casualty terrorism, this standard is applied with particular stringency to those holding primary responsibility for crime prevention and public safety. The 2026 convictions of Jayasundara and Fernando affirm that the receipt of specific, credible intelligence of an imminent attack, coupled with a clear legal duty and a culpable failure to respond, may ground the most serious forms of liability arising from omission. Whether these judgments will be upheld on appeal, and how they will shape future standards of official accountability, remain matters of ongoing legal and institutional significance.
